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Criminal

Intent.

In all nations and in all times the criminal law
has been ir.a more rude and imperfect state than the.
civil.

Even in

Blackstone s time the most trivial

offences were severely punished,!

A great ameliora-

tion of criminal law has taken place in England as
well as in hnerica during the last centu ry.

To

account for the harsh and overreaching penalties suffered for trivial offences is not difficult.
cause liest in the 'impetuous
ambition and revenge;

in

The

dictates of avarice,

the adoption of temporary

expedients on the spur of the moment and giving them
a lasting efficacy;

in

sanctioning penalties which

are commensurate with some unusuial and extraordinary
offence at the first recoil;
,york often of the theoretical

in

other words it

is

the

reformer who swings

the

penduhim from adjudged wrong to certain injuistice.
gririnal laws
care,

'founde
...

should then be made only with jealous
upon principles that ate permanent,

uniform and universal;

and always conformable to the

dictates of truth and jiustice.
In

this ameliorating_

'

process n. o one.. essential

of

crime has played so important a part as the determirx-

2

In

ing of the intent with which the act wacr,done.
tracing the parallel lines of civil and criminal

jurisprudence until they are lost in. reMote antiquity,
there is

no mark of distinction or separation so

plainly visible as the necessity of intent in criminal
jurisprudence.

In civil law the intent is

often a

matter of importance and as oftnn disregarded;
ever,

it

is

in

of the highest importance

since in its absence, generally speaking, no crime is
possible.
In this treatise we shall,
criminal intent only in

of necessity,

discuss

its restrictive sense.

We

shall be satisfied with the general principles underlying intent and avoid the exceptions.
in

For instance,

stating the rule that a person intends the hatutal

and probable consequences of his act, person is meant
to be the ordinary,

avercauge,

sane and normal man free

from the disabilities of insanity,

infancy, drunken-

ness duress etc.
As the first fundamnent
of c riminal Jurisprudence

an~3

underlying pr:inciple

then ,re have that no man is

guilty of any offence unless his intent was wrong.
It is

embodied in

t'he short and antithetical maxim

-

3

'actus non facit reum nisi mens rea".

The earliest

case, perhaps, i- which the rle is asserted is in
the

tLeges Henrici Primi" V.

28,

in which the follow-

ing langriage is used,"SI qis per coaccionem abjprare
cogatur

uod peimiiltos annos quiete tenuerit, non

in~rart

sed cogente perjurium erit.

nisi mens rea.

Reum non facit

Brown) s Maxims give the errliest

authority cited for its use as 3rd Institute,
fo.

10,)hem

Lord Coke.

Chap.

.

it appears as a marginal reference by
Another maxim of the same import is, SAc-

tus me i'nvito factus non est meus actus" an act done
by me against .my'-illis not my act.
This principle
then as promI1lated by theso familiar maxims is immutable in its nature.

It is older than the

from it the lav sprang.

Historv records instances

where it has been violated.

lawv

for

Siich instances, however,

are traceable to the prejudices and passions of men
rather than them

calm and deliberate judf-rements.

W/ith every return of reason; e principle reappears
to assert itself wvith greater power than before.

If

legislatures or courts trample dowvn this barrier constructed by the guiding hand of right there injustices
will recoil

"pon. themselves 'rvith

redoubled

severity

while their intended victim will be elevatnd

to the

A

i-nteior. we

or misery

ves ,vithout any respect to the happiness
Let

it may,

'rheat

-,e hold

of intention;
nocent.

on the

or,

This principle

ioned to need

tions-e

shal

Criminal

Lav. )

is too wrell

rulles

see

him in-

Science. )

any authorites

W1hther like all

simply on the ground

same ground we holl

(VTayland s M,)oral

"

oetion be

of an

the resIt

. man guilty

or oursel

others

inculpate or exculpnte

actually prodeed.

to the

t"By reference

science ag well.

in moral

holds

rule

The same

reputation of a martyr.

seat and

athorlsed ann

to svpoort

sanct-

it here.

it may be modified

by excep-

(See generally Bishop' s

later.

In the soame mann.er that an act iinaccompanie4 by
an intent is 1-npiiishable

so is

the mete

the Surisdiction of terresti.l court.rs
Which complains

in criminal actions

intent beyond
The

State

does-"nOt suffer

from the mere imaginings of men and consequently some

act must have followed the wrongful intent.
principle
Stewart
Rus.

is illustrated by the cases of Rex vs.
& Ryan 288 and Rex vs.

I. Russ.
Ryn

This

08.

Russ.&
.

1814.

This

former case was decide.i

Rya

...

The prisoner was tried

him with having

Fu ller I.

in

o-

his possession

a, indit~ment chargring
a quantity

of

counte'rfit

In the latter case

was no overt act.
'that

charged

defendant with force

the

the

theee

that

law in

the common

possession was no crime at

in

the mere having

that

decided

,unanimously

teserv

for whom the case was

judges,

The twelve

good.

for

it

of uttering

the pmrpose

coin with

indictment

and arms un-

of coilunterfit

coin

made to the likeness of good con of this realm,

with

lawfully

did procTre

the same

to itter

intent
1815

1

twenty pieces

unanimously decided

coin with intent

wvell

the-lesgit

that

the procuring

not ounishable

by some overt act.

to it

7as

insignifican~t

acts

are held

In

to be

intent

except as

might attach

,some cases
sufficient

where the mere conspiring

c o'sziracy

contended

overt act wile the
that

sufficient

an offence.

constitut!rv

this

Tn the above cases

having 1as held not to be sch
mere procurinrg

of such
Vhile

the principle

illustrates

iii

line very fine, never-

as draqvnrc the

for that a mere intent is
evidenced

The court,

was an offenge.

to utter

may be considered

sitting

etc.

is

very
as

in

enoug h.

The remarkable case of the Duke of Norfolk illu.strates

from what

The Dike wrote
previously

slight

letters

acts

intent

may be inferred.

to the Queen of Stotland who

harl, laid claim to the Enemlish Crown.

The

court held that inasmuch as the Queen of

Scotland

aspired to 'the throne of England he that married her
must be presumed to claim it also in her behalf, which
claim was inconsistent "vith the safety of the EnFrlish
Q1een.

From suich acts the Duke was presumed to have

compassed and imagined the Queen of England) s death.
He was accordingly tried and executed.

Thus it 'Till

be seen that some overt act, how,,ever slight, must
exist accompanied by the evil intent.

This rille is

solind and salutary for -rere it otherwise the courts
would have to pass upon the state of men) s minds which
wouIrd necessitate the assumption of oTitdience, an

attrtbute of Deity.
Shakespeare, who was more of a jprist than many

professedly so, has aptly statedtlis second underlyincT
and gui

ing principle of criminal jurisprudence:
0 MIy

brother 1hnd but justice,

In that he di,, the thing for vhich he died.

ForAngelo, his act did not

0

ertake his baA! intent,

And must be punished bu]t as an intent
That perished by the way:

thoughts are no subjects;

Intents but merely thoughts.

"

Since the intent then plays so important a part
let us ascertain

hat is meant by the term.

ciate a definit'ion absolute in

its nature is

To enun-

impossible.

7
As no tv o crimes are the sare, though similiar in their
nat ire, qo will it be impossible to find twvo minds

and und er e-if ferent c ircumstances, the sarne.

Intent

can only be ascertained from a caref-l observation of

all the overt acts that are connected rith the offence.
Intent, hovever, has been defined to be "The setting of
ones self and ones powers to bring about a certain result"
73).

(Clark's Analysis of Criminal Tjiability, p.
This is its original, derivative meaning and

from that standpoint is considered good.

V1.

L. Clark

in his "'Criminal Law" has given the following:

"

A

criminal intention is the state of mind of a person,
legal

when he consciously violates the law, ,ithout
pi. stificat ion or excuse.

(page 42)

The failure to dra--rdi t intion between intent
and motive has been the source of mrich litigation and
By motive we mean that power

oonfTI-ion by courts.

or action of the mind which incites or stimulates a
person to do or refu~e to do some act.

It sho Id

always be kept in mind that, motive is not an essential
element of crime and is n ever, of necessity, proved.
Motive is

important

ir

criminal

law% in

that it

used to showr the intent wvith which an act is

may be

done.

8

offere

to show that on a pre-

vious occasion A. had threatened to kill B.
the 'motive

Here

and

be seen to have been e'il

gill

offer-

To rebut this

ed to prove the killing accidental.
evidence testimony is

is

Evidence

B.

shoots and kills

A.

For example,

thus a

presumption mry arise that the act was not accidental
The hatred itself

but intended.
B.

is

however of A.

no part of the crime and of it

aainst

the courts cannot

take jurisdiction.
Neither will a motive,
exempt one from an illegal
The motive ma~y be a good

however good or praiseworthy,
act wrongfully committed.

one and yet the act will in

the eyes of the law be no less criminal.

A father

steals bread to save his starving children.

No one

will here question the motive and yet the act still
remains
it

larceny.

This principle,

may work injustice,

la,:r otherwise

is

so,nd and wise.

times

Were the

there w~ould be fewv convictions

for there are fewv cases in
are not mixed

though at

of c rime,

',hich the extraneous motives

up with the particular

evil intent.

Hindu mother casts her infant babe in~o the Gan~es

appease the gods;
of conjugal
a benefit;

the libertine invades

life believinc

he is

The
to

the sanctuary

rendering_

to society

the Morman practiced polvgamy devoutly be-

9

as his r.eligion taught,

lieving,

in

waving his smoking pistol

the air,

theatre

uttering

that
staitly

semper tyrannis"

,"Sic

now famosexpress

the Bible

from the "ashington

itiBooth fled

rdemands

that

persisting that he was simply obeying the mandates
a higher power when he assasinated
The conscience of the -rongdoer

examples

of

Lincoln.

President

calls these instances

s dt.y heroically dona;

rirhte

of

society

calls them crimes.
in

The contrary arFments are vi6os
leave out

of

the qiiesten the

idea of government

law and make each individual' s conscious

we Would

of the

os t

Calendars

sanction an4 allowr

heinous crimes

of the nations

enthusiasm, thein

is

they
by

the sole

Should we follo.. such

and final arbiter of his acts.
a rinL

that

to ru.n riot some

to be found on the Newgate

of the ,vorld.

Scientific

no d efense to an inriitpment for

disinterring a corpse;
minity of a bad man is

the motive of ridding the comno defense to homicide.

No

matter w hat may he the motive leading to a particular
act,

if

the act be

rta~rling that
meritorious.
father

illegal

it

is

indictable,

not'with-

some one or more of the motives may he
Thus

a cease

is

cossuIlting the welfare

found -7rhere a mother
of their

child

dreme r

and
it

in
better to s nd its
allowr

it

their eyes,

They accordin

tle Isaac,

called this

,
irer.

-

Harmon 4,5 Fed. Rep. 414;
"

sacrifice

Never-

of their litv --. Cooley

; U.

1.22
2-as
Ma s.

Reynolds

vs. TJ.

V~heaton' s Criminal Law'" Vol.

Clark' s

of wick-

the deed which,

(See g-enerally Corn.

vs

7; Co.

Pick.

did
*

l

orld

rir-hteous and commendable.

was

theless the Statn

145;

to Heavern than

to rv n its chance throwh this

edness and woe.
17

litt le soil direct

Crimina-l ILas pp.

The courts hnvel also

44l.

I.

,

S. vs.

S. 98
Sec.

U. S.
119;

)

laid do-rn certain presnmp-

C

tions

in criminal prosecutions

rhich aid in the consid-

eration of and judgeement upon the 7gi.,
one does an unlawfP7l act he
to intend

to do it"

intends his acts.
the natural

or as

is by the law presme

is

sometires

said, a man

Again, a man is presumed to i"tend

and probable consemien6es

the gronnd that these rMist,
plation

"W1hen

facts.

if he is

of his

acts

o-,"

have been within his contem-

same manu and

acts " ith the delib-

erat ion which ought to govern men in the conduct of
their affairs.
5-6.)

Thee

particular

(May' s "Crimina~l Law"
re ho~ever classes of

Sec.

cases where

intent

is

necessarily proved

sich that the act

in

itself

is

7, pp.
the

and tbey are

not criminal and is

II

such intent

so only when

made

consider
namely,

that cls

consenuences

Ve

provedr.

of cass where

that a man intends

and probable

is

nOW

7il

the presumption,

his acts

and

the

ratural

of such acts.

In an early case 3
aule aSelwyn, Kin v .
Vixon
Lord Ellenborogh distinctly and unhesitatingly
hd
lair-

downn

the

rule.

furnish bread

anti as eroy'ton~

t•s nd

The defend.t was

for the Royal Military Asylim.

indictment charged him with adulterating
a motion was then made in arrest
cause that

the indictmemt

"It

is

The4

the food and

of judgement for the

did not show that he intended

to injure the chilrIren s health.
said:

employedto

Lord Ellenborough

an universal principle

that when a man

is charged with doing an act of which the probab)le
consequences may be highly injurious the intention is
an inference of

lawT

act and here

was alle7ed

loaves
Iii

it

for the use

the case

of U.

resulti-ng

from the doirg of the

that

and support

S.

v .

he delivered

of

the

children. i

Taintor 11 Blatchford

doctrine

is

Courts.

Here the defendant was charged

'iistinctly

the

laid do'; n

by the U.

S.

the
Circueit

wvith embez-

zlIing money f rom a bank of - hich he was cashie r.
his

trial

in

the

lower court he

offere-,

evidence

On
to

12

prove

that his

some o- the directors

bank and
them.

acts were known to the presidernt

of

the

an.d were rarctioned bV

This evidence was not offere

to disprove his

acts bult to shoir that thern

was no intent to dera',d

or injure

indictment.

said:

as chargecl

"One propositio
in

intent charged
proof

in the

of tle

involved is that

the indictment

acts clone.

It

has

hardly bee'?

r
r,,le of law that a man rnust be he 1-1

It

applicable

to criminal

mot ion was

thus

In

the case

the court said:
upon rmotives,

a general

to intend the
This

cases as well

as civil.

is

rule
"

His

at p.

107

lost.
of Com.

York

vr.

"A sane man,

9 Metcalf

acting

a voluntary agent,

must be presumed to intend the natural

and probable conseouencrs
fore,

doiibtedl
is

his acts.

of

consemiences

the guilty

sho'n by the

was

but that this oroposition is correct.

necessary

Benedict, J.

of his

acts.

one voluntarily and willfily does

w4f,

there

an act -which

has a direct tendency to destroy another' s life,
natural and necessary conclusion
he

intended

d.efendant
murder,

from suc...h act

and +he

cou.rt

as
lair"d

the

is that

so to destroy such person3 s li' . "

in this case

-

The

char~red-vith commission of
do--n the

rule that

if it

13
were proved he did the act

of

a mortal

inflicting

"'17ond upon the rleceased malice was to be inferred
sch acts Twrere proved,

unless

the evidence

by a preponderance of

as "-roild extenuate

the homicide and

duce it

to manslal,,ghter.

See also the

of Com.

vs. Weebster 5 Cuish.

rule is

approved and strongly reasserted.

jurisdictions

there is

ob-:iotis

vith

and

see whether

the great mass o

the case

of Stokes

the

fact

judge

in

rule

People,

defendant was indicted on
trial

in

those

here

is

this

case

is

of

in

con lict

elsewhere.

53 N.

charge

a

evidence.

Y.,

177,

the

of murder and the

his clhrrge to th e jury said:

of the killing

in

to the Ne-r York

adjudication7

vs.

the

and probable

one by preponderating

"'e shall now turn oiur attention
cases

that

This presumption

of such acts.

course a rebuttable

where

a Presumption of lar that

man intends his acts and the natural
conse oences

familiar case

at mage 35,

From the above cases it is

re-

Th.m

being coned:ed,

it

becomes the duty of the prisoner here to satisfy you
that
the

it

wvas not murder which the law' wvould imply from

fact of the killing under the c ircumstances,

the absence
the

third

of

explanation that

degree

or

justifiable

it

in

rpas manslaughter

homicide,

becaus

as

in
I

14
have said the fact of killing being conceded a-d the
law implying motive from the circumstinces of the case7
the prosecutors case is clearly and entirely made
out and therefore you can havve no reasona.le doubt as
to that, unless the prisoner shpll give evidence sfefic ient to satisfy vou that it lwaps

j-1stifiable muirder

under the circumstances of the case.
0rovC5I

J

"

On the apperl

held tha.t to say that there arises a legal

implication. prom the fact of killing in the absence of
proof exte-nuating the circumstances was error and that
while such charge was correct at comnon larv by the
New York statiite was wvholly wrorg.
this case is not w7hpttaS

RThe
aruestion i,

the rule at comnon lav as to

the implication of malice from the act whether sicn
rule is dediced
analogies

from authority or principle and legal

The Q.estion arises upon the statutes of

.

the state by

rhich homicide

excusable, miirder in the

is m:de justifiable or

first or second dree or

manslaughter in one o? four degrees,

.ete.i..

byth

intention and c ircum.stances of its perpetration.
This opinion argu.es tha~t the c~ime consists o
and an in nt
impossibel

-rhich must concur

an act

e~'d it is therefore

to convict unless both exist.

tion may be inferred

U

from the act

but

The inten-

this i

pr3n-

15

ciple is an inference of ftet to be drawn by the jury
and not an implication or
court,

law to be applied by the

At the common la'r this presumption was one

of la-7 applied by the cou-rt -v'hile here
sumption of fact to be drawvn by the

it is

jury rhich amounts

to nothing£ more nor less than an argument.
be remembered however that this is

a pre-

It should

so from the nature

of the statte.
In People vs. Polwell the rdefendants were charged
with conspiracy.
for proposals

They had neglected to advertise

for supplies for the iuse of the poor of

Kings County as renuired by statute.
ofered evideice to sho,-r that
did not knoirr of

the

The defendants

they acted in good

statute and tha+

tention to violate the statute.

faith,

there was no in-

The trial judge held

that ignorance of law or absence of intent-would not
avail the defence and
by statute

or omitted to ro that whinh was so required,

they wrere guilty.
be erroneous
as aL ma

if they did the act prohibited

This charge on appeal was held to

in that the intent was not to be

inferred

er of lawv but wvas to be proved as well as the

act itself.
In Filkins vg.
that whenever

People 69 N.

the degree of

Y.

101, the court held

the offense dependr

upon

16
the particular intent with which an act
intent to be inferred

is

done the

from the c ircimstances

is

for

the jury and every fact which will throw light upon
that question may be given
I

People vs.

in

evidence.

125 N.

Flack

were charged vith conspiracy.
the coiort
the

said:

324,

Y.

Andrews

"The presurnption

J.

,

speaking for

that a person intends

ordinary and probable conseruences

as applied to criminal ceases,

the daefe'ndants

of his acts

a rule to aid the

is,

jury in

reaching a conclusion upon a question of fact and is
not a presumption of law. "

No matter how clear and

incontrovertIble the proof may be as showing a criminal intention, still

the o-uestion

remains for

the

jury and must be passed upon by them alone anf1 never
can be ruled as a question o1
"Jurors may be perverse4,

law by the court.

the ends of Justice may be

defeated by unrighteous verdicts, but so long as
function of the judge and jury are distinct,
responding to the

la:'4 the other to the

- ac .+s

the

the onr
neither

can invade the province of the other W4ithout Aestroy~

ing of trial

by court and jury.

In the case of W~imai vs.
N.

Y.

Sup.

1037 and in

based on an argument

9 I{isc.

"

People reported
Reports

in

32

one decision

for statv of proceedings we

find

17
the

N.

doctrine

Y.

Vimar aPchrg: ).rged-7ith

Term.

evidece

it

appeared

dra r checks

forgery.

not

to

He did dra'

iirm acd

s n-me upon the back.

of drawin--. the check and making it
-ras

the

that d-fendant 1vas a ithorized to

a check payable to a crr4itor of the

itor

From

in the name of his employer.

indorsed the payee'

General

the

to by

adhered

stoutly

conce l his overdrafts

The object
to the cre 1 -

payable

employer

-)e-raud his

but merely to

or the appropriation

ployer) s money to his o' rn use.

of his

The General

both cases held that the act itself
to convict him of forgery,

the

'gas not

em-

Term in

sifficient

instead of being presumed

from the act as a question of Iawwas one to be passed
u!pon

t1e

py
j'ry.

Let us keep ou r mind upon these cases while

re

consider that class of cases where the act having been
done an.
that

proved t hera

arises

there , as a criminal

have po',rer

to pass statutes

a, :ays f ollovec

intention.

egisltres

the violation

by the penalty regardless

,
ofte ofen'ers

Kiber1

an irrebut~ble presumption

N. Y.,

!rou
re milk to b

mind at the time.
21)

mere act of selling milk

ot -p

wrhich is

of the state

(People vs.

A statute may,

up to a certab

of

for i'-stnce,

st Andard an

the

to the s+.ndn,.rd is

i8
ground for convictioo
howing

that

regardless of

Evidence

intent.

that he acted pridently and actually believe?

the milk

-ras pure would'be

alone being proved criminal

presumed.

of no avail.

intent

(People vs. Kihlrr,

is

The act

irrebutablv

1

16, N. Y.

Legislatures may also auithoratively determine the
ristance

houses "co

rithin wvhich pow der maga'ines and

be erected from cities.

In State vs. Essex C117b 20 At.
-,-ere

R. 770 the facts

these: A bona fide social club out of its common

fund purchased
such c lub.
ollo

slauhcnter

s

liaior and

The
"hoever

sold t'em to the members ofn

statute .claimed to be violated nras as

rahall sell

any stron.

or

siritous

liquor at any time and at any place within said city
without having a lieen,
se therefor, shall
pay fifty dollars for each offense. "

forelit and
This was held to

be one of that class of cases which does not depend
upon the intent

"I

offender.

the offense consists

in

the act done,

the intent 1 ith which it. is
it i
Tholy
imateial

this class of eases

done.

regardless of

In my juri gement

nd rot a legitimate

subject of

inquiry whether an i-tention to violate or evade the

la7- was present or not.

Intent constittes

0o part

19
of the offense.

The simple question presented

did he do the act expressly irnhibited. "
Conviction is -ell

Ir Uaisted vs.
is

lealy
a

sssed.
be done,

is

If so

the

grounded.

State, 32 A. Re

enu-ciatfd

2'-5the-principle

,

,nd authoritie,s cited an-d dis-

To.enever the IOr positively borbirls an act
it becomes thereu1po
ipso facto illegral to

to

o it villfnly or in some cases even ignorartly or may
be to effect an ulterior

laudible

ob1ject"

ma,
y be ain indictmet wtithout the a !cition
rilpt motive.

"Nothing in

la

than that in stattutory crimes

then-re have

the vrle

of any cor-

is more in01ontestable
the maxim that crime

only proceeds fIom criminal minds
Hei'e

ard t-ere

does not apply.

- as

a corollarv or

modification of the orincioln that a man intends the
nd probable consequences of his act - that
natural a,
in

some cases where the crimes are prohibited the

intent is a question Of fact for

the

ury, and second,

that where the statute expressly and positively forbids
an act to be done the mere c4oing is sufficient ground
upon which to base a conviction regardless of the
intent.
Thus

it

will be seen that not a great pessimistic

turn of mind is required to foresee and

expect trouble

20
ahead of us..
siriliar
facts

The different
cases founded upon very
apparently diverge leading us on until

we

lost

are utterly

*io,, ldrrzfc
earef,.l
that
are

ot% of all

the

tory const.c.tion.
body be ascertained
justifiable

and -rrithi
let

the

VIe will
In

(ood'-ow

n o1
vs.

and that

tlp

of

constituitional

consider

a

65 M-e.

a

to n a

thn

principle

intent

consequences

State

all

such intent if

ana

in

case s we shall

fundamental
Let

standing

Qpirions.

these

an be reconciled

controlled by

control,

beTildered

lasbnir!7j iristic

examinat

they

a.d

decisions
of

the

fInd

stau-

enacting

legitimate,
sanction

shall

be "-hat they ray.

few i11Ystrat ve

cases.

?r),a a roman married a

scond time, believing that she had been legally absolved from her

first

hnsband by divorce.

held to be no deferse
in

its
Ir

to the statute which was general

nature.
Comr. vs.

second time,
her first

This was

Nas's

7 Metcalf

believing

from his

husband was dead.

In, Queen- vs.
and, statut e were

472 a womanrmarried

Tolson: 2?

long ab~sen~ce

NotQ.

B.

etc.

a

that

ilonred as a defense.

Div.

similiar to those in

and while a different conclusion war'

168 the

facts

the Nash case
reached both

21
decisions went upon the ascertainment
tion theory already
be

found holdinr

laid do-n.

that

in

is

No case probably can.

case of a gereral prohibiotry

statuTte a corrupt motive must
statute

of the construle-

be interpolated

into

the

to e onstituite the offence or) the ground as

sometimes

claimed that

trary to natural
R. , 245)

If

otherwise

ju.tice.

this

riile be

it

would be con-

(Halsted vs.

State,

followued all

the cases

become harmonized and apparent

32 A.

inconsisteneies

are

scattered and disappear.
As tc unintended

results.

a oerso- . intending

If

to do some unla ful act and wrongrul,
crime acci-entaly he
Thus
kills

if
C.

A.

shoots

A. will

Mink 123 Mass.

is

at B.

commits some

nevertheless
to kill

held guilty.

him and accidentally

be guilty of rur:er.

I

.

422 the defendant was about

Corn.

vs.

to commit

suicide and one to whom she was engaged attempted
prevent

her and w:ras thus shot.

to be done howvever must
malvim prohibitum.

In Rex vs.
dant attempted

(Corn.

Blackburn,
to commi

The

he malum ir
vs.

the defendant

Here

was foun4' guilty of rnansla ,ghter.

Adams,

2 past P.
rapes up.o.n a

to

crime

intended

se and not merely
ll'

}as
M s.

,

323. )

C. 711 the defen-non

a.

she

22
offe re r

him money if he woulc

desist.

This was held

to be robbery though his original intention was to commit

rape.

This of course would not be so helgPi

New York.
In this thesis

the principles

discussed are

pri:cipally the following: That no man can be convicted
of a crime unless his intent is evil;

That a mere in-

tent except as evidene,d by some overt act is unpuhishable;

That a man is presumed to intend the natural and

probable consequences of his acts as
,rell

as the acts

themselves;:T-at under the New-r York statutes the rule
is modified to the effect that tle

intent is never

presumed as a qestion of law but as a ci'estion of
fact to be passed upo
by the jury; That where the intent is an ingredient of the crime it mu.st be proved
and can never be presimed;

That the LegislAtvre has

au.thority to make certain acts criminal and in. such
cases there is an irrebuta~1e presumption
intention;

That a man is

acts where such are the
tended wrongful act.

7Y

C4

of criminal

liable for his unintend ed
effects or results o f an in-

